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The credit crisis that has consumed the U.S.for the past two years has offered many
different lessons to many types of people, This paper discusses the start of the crisis, the
lessons learned from it and behavioral changes that came about because of it, and the
prevention of a subsequent crisis. The main three lessons learned discussed are:
government intervention is a necessary evil, remembering the basics about lending, and
what goes up, must come down, and vice versa. While there are many other issues that
could be discussed, these three are key in the prevention of a subsequent crisis and are
thoroughly examined.
Introduction
Two years ago in January of 2007, no one believed that we would be in the midst of a crisis as
massive as the one in which we are currently. Many economists and scholars claimed that it was only a
matter of time before we would dip into a downturn, as it is part of the economic cycle of a society.
However, even they could not have predicted that it would be as bad or widespread as it is today. Many
consumers at that time did not care about the future; they were only concerned about the present.
Many of them did not realize that they might not have a job down the road, or that they might not be
able to pay their mortgage. While this crisis seemed so unexpected, looking back, we can see clear signs
of why it happened and what needs to be done in order to fix it, and prevent it from happening again.
However, not everything that resulted from this crisis was a bad thing. Many lessons were
learned by many people, including consumers and financial institutions. Those that will be discussed
include:
. Government entities are a necessary evil
. Remembering the basics about lending
. What goes up, must come down, and vice versa
While these are the major lessons learned from this crisis, there are many other that span across many
different people. This crisis has taught us many things and showed us the vulnerabilities in our society,
especially in regulatory oversight of financial institutions. While there are signs of emergence from this
crisis, the effects will be felt for many years after it ends.
Start of the Crisis
Pinpointing the start of this financial crisis is difficult, mainly because there are many different
factors that contributed to its genesis. I believe the element that contributed most to this crisis is the
subprime mortgage market.
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Many financial institutions are faced with an increased number of subprime mortgages,
especially those in foreclosure. This increase in subprime mortgages is mainly due to the fact that many
banks relaxed their lending standards. In an interview with Bryce Lang, assistant branch manager ofthe
Oswego Chase Bank, Lang confirmed that he saw relaxed lending standards at his bank. For customers
whose credit scores met a certain threshold, the bank did not ask for income verification and often did
not require a down payment. Traditional lending standards require a 20 percent down payment, and
both income and employment verification. Other banks are tightening their standards even more; Wells
Fargo, for example, now requires a 25 percent down payment on all its mortgages. It is estimated that
30 to 40 percent of consumers who would have been approved for a mortgage during the "housing
boom" will not be approved now ("Wary Banks Revert to Strict Lending Standards").
The housing boom between 2001 and 2005 saw new-home sales grow at a rate of 9.4% and
house values grow at 10%, while mortgage rates were at their lowest in years ("After the Housing
Boom"). These factors combined to double home values within five years. Home values during this
period were often overstated by appraisers who needed to meet the demands of the market. Appraisal
companies justified these inflated figures, citing pressure from banks to meet the demand of the
number of loans that were being processed. If a house is expected to appreciate in value, there is also a
higher likelihood that the home will be overvalued to begin with (Mishkin). This explains why an
appraiser might overvalue a house: he expects the price to increase in the future, such that even if the
house is somewhat overvalued now, its value will eventually catch up to the appraisal. This increase in
home prices, coupled with an increase in interest rates by the Federal Reserve, set in motion the
downturn in the housing market.
During the housing boom, the relaxation of lending standards led to an increase in those
marginal, riskier accounts. Banks took these accounts on in order to increase their profits by charging
higher interest rates. Mr. Lang confirmed this practice in his own bank, and observed that it was
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common practice in banks across the country. These marginal accounts are now largely the mortgages
that are in foreclosure, and are known as "subprime."
The main difference between a prime and a subprime mortgage is that the costs are much
higher for a subprime loan. Principle and interest payments, late fees, and fines for delinquent payments
are all subject to a "subprime premium" (Chomsisengphet 32). And because many banks did not require
down payments for mortgages, borrowers entered into contracts in which they had no stake. It became
easier for these people to walk away from their homes because they had not invested a great deal of
money (aside from monthly payments) into them. According to the Mortgage Bankers' Association, by
the end of 2008, 48 percent of subprime adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) were at least one payment
past due. In addition, from the third to fourth quarter of 2008, subprime loans in foreclosure increased
116 basis points to 13.71 percent. In order to reduce defaults, banks need to make it costly for the
borrower to just walk away (Jaffee 5).
Some federal regulations may have contributed to an increase in these marginal accounts as
well. With the passing of the Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980
(DIDMCA), it became legal for lenders to make higher-priced mortgages. If a borrower's credit rating
was not high enough, they could just charge a higher interest rate. The new homeowners that were
created over the housing boom were largely first-time homeowners, and largely racial and ethnic
minorities. This increase can be attributed to the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). This act gave
banks incentive to make loans to low-income borrowers. The subprime mortgages that were created out
of this boom had exotic terms and conditions that many borrowers did not fully understand (Gramlich
106).
While marginal accounts and subprime lending were commonplace throughout the country, not
all banks contributed to the credit crisis. David Conlin, branch manager of the DeKalb Castle Bank, stated
that his bank did not use relaxed lending standards. He noted that Castle recently acquired another bank
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that had employed those relaxed standards, and he saw the unfortunate results. Conlin also pointed out
that Castle has since tightened standards in regards to the loan amount as a percentage of the collateral
value. Conlin admitted that, though his bank maintained appropriate standards, it did loan a significant
amount to the land development and construction industries. The decline in those industries in recent
months has resulted in some bad loans.
Another factor that exacerbated the credit crisis is the practice of bundling and securitizing
subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed securities. When owners defaulted on their mortgages, the
interest payments on the securities were cut off. As a result, the liquidity risk as well as the default risk
of the securities increased. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are two government agencies that bought
many of these mortgage-backed securities in order to give banks money for more loans (Flowers 60). In
September 2008, the government seized both of these companies because officials were concerned
with increased losses in their mortgage portfolios. Because they were deemed "too big to fail," these
companies were placed under a conservatorship by the Federal Housing Finance Agency and the CEOs
were ousted. This action is understandable, considering that the two firms had lost a combined $14
billion over the previous four quarters (Somerville). Furthermore, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac bought
these securities because they were given investment-grade ratings by credit rating agencies. These
agencies gave investment-grade ratings to securities that were obviously based on loans of subpar
quality (Verschoor 11). Because of the default of these so-called "investment-grade" securities, many
believe that increased transparency of these investments would allow investors to better understand
what they are buying (Jaffee 6).
Lessons Learned and Behavioral Changes
The current credit crisis offers many lessons to be learned. Consumers and lenders (financial
institutions) are the two groups most directly affected by this crisis and have, therefore, the most to
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learn. While it is difficult to numerically-measure the far-reaching implications, certain observable
behavior changes indicate what people have learned.
Most consumers have been affected in some respect by the credit crisis. Some have had their
hours cut at work, resulting in decreased income. Others have lost their jobs entirely, leaving them in a
state of emergency concerning their futures. Both Mr. Lang and Mr. Conlin confirmed that they saw
changes in their customers' behaviors over the past six months. Mr. Lang noticed that many of his
customers were withdrawing funds from time deposits before the expiration date and transferring
money from savings accounts to checking accounts more frequently. Mr. Conlin also noticed an increase
in the same type of transfer. Mr. Lang also stated that, while many of his customers did want to save
money, they did not want to open savings accounts because the interest rates were so low.
Another factor that has contributed to consumer indebtedness is increased credit card usage.
According to the U.S.Census Bureau, the number of credit cardholders has increased from 159 million in
2000 to 173 million in 2006, and is expected to grow to 181 million in 2010. In 2008, 55 percent of credit
cardholders kept a balance on their card, which is up 2 percent from 2007. And finally, between 1989
and 2006, the total amount of credit card charges increased from $69 billion a year to $1.8 trillion a year
(Schulz). These statistics clearly show an increased number of cardholders and an increased level of total
credit card debt. Consumers were spending money that their income was secure and growing. In an
interview with Bonnie Brandon, a retail sales associate, she confirmed that she used her credit cards
more often than she should have. Her income is based largely on commissions and, in this economic
downturn, has decreased dramatically; she can now pay only the minimum amount on her credit cards
every month. Consequently, she has cut her spending dramatically and no longer buys items she cannot
afford.
Millions of Americans are in situations similar to Mrs. Brandon's. Javelin Strategy and Research
found that 37 percent of consumers say they are using their credit cards less, and 28 percent say that
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paying off their credit cards has become more difficult (Schulz). So, while many consumers are using
their credit cards less, they are still having difficulty making payments; one in six households makes only
the minimum payment on its credit cards every month (Schulz). Consumer spending decreased for the
sixth month in a row in December 2008, mainly because of decreased incomes, which also fell in
December ("Factory Decline Eases,Consumer Spending Drops"). This information reveals one clear
trend among consumers: they are spending less, and are paying out of their own pockets. Because many
consumers are earning less money, they have less money to spend on luxury items and are focusing on
the necessities: groceries, electric, water, transportation, etc.
Lenders have also learned difficult lessons from this credit crisis. The Federal Reserve reported
that two-thirds of its banks have tightened credit standards between May and July of 2008. Consumers
have also noted more stringent standards, citing higher interest rates and low approval for loans. Credit
card companies have decreased the number of applications sent to high-risk areas and are decreasing
credit limits offered to high-risk customers (Shinkle). Mrs. Brandon also noticed this change, explaining
that she used to receive approximately five to six credit card applications per week, while she now
receives only one.
Prevention of a Subsequent Crisis
Along with a crisis of this magnitude comes a multitude of suggestions from scholars to
consumers across the globe. Everyone believes that they have the new idea that will"fix" the banking
industry and its problems. While there is room for improvement in the banking system, many other
issues need to be addressed in order to prevent another crisis like this one.
Mr. Conlin and Mr. Lang both confirmed that their banks have tightened standards since the
crisis, and will tighten them further in the future. Banks have also shifted their focus away from
financially engineering their balance sheets in order to post increased profits. Instead, they are focusing
on the retail-bank activities of customer acquisition, customer retention, customer service and creating
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financial products and services that will satisfy customers' needs. This is proving to be quite difficult
because many consumers mistrust their banks. Paul Worthington, a specialist in branding services,
believes that banks need to radically change their strategies in three ways. The first is to instill consumer
trust by focusing on actions, not messages. The second is to refocus on deposits, and the third is to
move to a consumer-centric model. This model helps banks concentrate more on their customers and
less on balance sheet manipulation (32).
Many people believe that a reform of the banking system is needed in order to improve it. Dr.
David Mcilroy, a lawyer who specializes in banking and insolvency laws, recommends three actions to be
taken to reform the banking system. The first is to minimize the moral hazard associated with loan
origination-the lack of incentive to be careful about who they lend to and how much. Mcilroy suggests
that banks be required to maintain a certain percentage of the dollar amount of the loan, therefore
increasing the incentive to make sure customers can pay back their loans (287-288). The second action is
to increase the transparency of risk in financial products, providing the buyers of mortgage-backed
securities and collateralized debt obligations with sufficient information about their risk. Mcilroy
suggests that securitized objects be standardized or, if that cannot be done, banks should not be
allowed to deal with objects for which they cannot obtain a risk profile (289). The final action is to
reform Basel II,which gives investments weights based on their credit ratings. Ifan investment loses its
AAArating, banks are expected to adjust their capital accordingly. Mcilroy suggests that regulators
require banks to hold more capital than the minimum 8 percent so they are prepared in the case of a
sudden market downturn (290-291).
Although there are unwritten traditional lending standards that most financial institutions abide
by, there are no regulatory lending standards enforced. The Federal Reserve needs to create a
standardized process for lending money that includes gathering proof of income, the customer's credit
report, and a substantial down payment of at least 20 percent, among other requirements. Regulations
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intense regulation over derivative and exotic securities including credit default swaps, which were
blamed for much of the meltdown of the market (Crutsinger). The plan also requires large hedge funds
and private equity firms to register with the SECif their assets exceed a certain size. Finally, firms whose
collapse could "pose a risk to the entire financial system" would be required to have more capital than
others (Drawbaugh). Geithner's proposal is one that was needed a long time ago, and is a good start to
the reform of the financial markets. By having this increased government regulation over especially risky
securities and firms, it decreases the chances of another financial crisis tremendously. However, there
are some criticisms to Geithner's proposal. Some are afraid that there will be too much government
involvement in the financial markets, and others are concerned that one regulator might become much
more powerful than the others, which could be harmful. One suggestion to this objection would be to
have a "college of regulators" oversee different parts of the plan (Crutsinger). Geithner's proposal is a
good base to build upon and will require extensive changes before it is actually put into action,
something that many lawmakers hope will happen as soon as possible.
Conclusion
As President Barack Obama said in a recent speech, there is no quick fix for this economic crisis.
While many consumers wish that this would all just go away overnight, there are things that need to be
fixed in order to strengthen the economy and decrease the chances of another crisis of this magnitude
occurring again. There will always be downturns in an economy, but the goal of the Federal Reserve and
other governmental agencies is to dampen those downturns. While this downturn is big enough to be
called a recession, we have to remember that there have been far worse times in our history, and we
managed to move on from those, just as we will be able to move on from this one.
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